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ABSTRACT 
 
Gender differences have long been documented in earnings, employment opportunities, and 
time spent within the unpaid care economy. This paper joins the recent efforts in the economics 
literature on gender differences in asset ownership. Specifically, it investigates whether a 
gender-specific composition in asset ownership between heads of households and spouses can 
be detected among low-income, urban households in Bangkok, Thailand. The present case study 
explores this issue empirically, using a sample of 134 couples from a 2002 survey that collected 
data at the level of the individual respondent on accumulated physical and financial assets. Both 
husband and wife were interviewed separately and the data gathered from the interviews include 
pertinent household and individual information on employment, credit and household decision-
making issues. The findings suggest that asset composition varies by gender, indicating that 
further investigation is warranted on this topic. Tobit and Probit tests are used to examine the 
factors that may affect this gendered pattern.  
 
 
JEL Classifications:  D31, J16, O17, R29 
 
Keywords: asset distribution, gender, Thailand  3
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Much of the existing research on disparities in asset ownership is carried out at the level of the 
household and while this unit of analysis is in many instances practical and appropriate, it 
cannot capture potential asymmetries between men and women within households. Research has 
shown that gender differences in head of household￿alongside race, class, ethnicity, nationality 
and age￿are indeed associated with asset ownership gaps (Caner and Wolff 2004, Wolff 
2001a). But less is known about intra-household differences. This limitation is partly due to the 
present methods of wealth data collection, which, by focusing on ￿household￿ level questions 
adhere, perhaps unintentionally, to the validity of unitary household models.
 1,2  
This paper seeks to make a contribution by empirically investigating gender differences 
in asset ownership within households in urban, low-income communities in Bangkok. The 
building of assets among low-income and poor households as a means of poverty alleviation and 
self-empowerment is at the heart of community based development efforts, microfinance 
schemes and of new thinking among development researchers and international organizations. 
Part of the debate revolves around the issue of whether or not the poor save. Sherraden (2001) 
has demonstrated that, in fact, the poor do save when provided with the opportunity and 
appropriate conditions that address their concerns, such as reasonable subsidies.
3 Zimmerman 
and Carter (2003) argue that poor peasant households in Africa do save, but as they accumulate 
under higher risk and subsistence constraints than wealthier ones, they end up with portfolio 
allocations that yield lower rates of return. 
Research has also shown that women in rural areas own a miniscule proportion of land 
and technology (Rebecca Pearl 2003) which adversely affects their future asset building 
potential. But when it comes to urban low income and poor households, we have less  
documentation. To date, assets among urban, informal sector workers in low-income 
communities have yet to be examined. The growth of the informal economy and the persistence 
of poverty in urban areas raise the need to better understand gender patterns in asset ownership 
                                                 
1. There is a growing literature that critiques this unrealistic ￿unitary household￿ view.  See for example, Kabeer 
1997, Agarwal 1997, Carter and Katz 1997, Sen 1990, to name a few. The unitary household model, expounded 
originally by Gary Becker in the 1960￿s, conceives the household as a collection of individuals who have a single 
set of interests, thereby, precluding conflict or inequality within the household. 
2. A notable exception is the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) which gathers data on both heads of households 
and spouses, cited in Frankenberg et al 2003, p.286.  
3. Cited in Wolff (2001b).   4
as they affect credit access, the level of micro-enterprise earnings, and consumption smoothing 
abilities of households. 
Our study investigates the existence (or absence) of differences in the composition and 
distribution of owned assets between heads of households and spouses, among low income and 
poor households in the Bangkok metropolitan area. It is based on a 2002 sample survey, from 
which we utilize a sub-sample of 134 households, situated in three urban squatter communities.
4 
In what follows, we address the following questions: (1) what types of assets do these low 
income households tend to accumulate; (2) do men and women own similar kinds of assets or is 
there a distinct gendered-pattern of asset ownership; and (3) what factors influence the gender-
specific composition of asset ownership?  
Below, in section II, we discuss the significance of making visible gender differences in 
asset ownership for developing countries. Section III contextualizes the sample we used in this 
paper. Our empirical findings on real  tangible assets and financial assets owned by women and 
men are presented in sections IV and V. The last part summarizes. Throughout, we identify 
several caveats that caution the reader in interpreting the empirical results.  
  
II. GENDER DIFFERENCES OF ASSET OWNERSHIP IN LDC￿S. 
 
Accumulated assets serve many functions, among them enjoying a higher standard of living, 
allowing for bequests and providing a buffer during times of economic hardship. In addition to 
examining these issues, documentation of gender disparities in financial and non-financial asset 
ownership, within the context of LDC￿s, has been of significance in at least four research areas.  
The first one pertains to the link between gender-based inequalities over productive 
assets such as land, capital and education and their detrimental impact on women￿s ability to 
partake in the opportunities afforded by economic development (Dollar and Gatti 1999). 
Decreasing gender gaps, the argument goes, promotes not only equity but also efficiency, 
thereby enhancing the pace of economic development.
5 The need arises then to document and 
explain such disparities. Studies show that gender imbalances in assets can persist across 
generations in some cases and diminish in others. Quisumbing and Maluccio (1999) find that in 
                                                 
4. Lack of gender disaggregated official statistics on this area is often circumvented by data collection efforts. 
5. ￿Engendering Development: through gender equality in rights, resources and voice￿ (2001) A World Bank 
Policy Research Report; Oxford University Press.  5
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, South Africa and Indonesia women bring fewer assets to marriage and 
that these inequalities persist throughout their life cycle.  In other cases, such as in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, entitlements to land are found to be held by men and rights to land are given to women 
only through marriage, but even these rights are nullified upon the death of the husband or upon 
divorce (Gray and Kevane 1996).  Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg (1997) identify 
situations where women in Indonesia bring substantial asset holdings to marriage, and where 
they can claim these assets upon divorce.  
A second strand of research investigates the implications of intra-household allocation 
and decision-making process. If allocation and access to resource is not gender neutral it may 
impact on intra-household decisions regarding human capital formation, production, and 
consumption (Johnson 2004). Research has shown that in India (Duraisamy 1992) and in rural 
Philippines (Quisumbing 1994 and Quisumbing and Maluccio 1999), children receive higher 
expenditure allocation in clothing, medical attention and are more likely to attend school if the 
mother has more assets. In examining the differences in the bargaining power of husband and 
wife and its effect on consumption expenditures in rural Bangladesh, Quisumbing and de la 
Briere (2000) found that on average, wives￿ total wealth represents approximately 10 percent of 
the household’s wealth, with land the most unequally distributed asset (less than 5 percent of the 
household￿s land in all sites).  
  A third area explores differences in savings and borrowing behavior between men and 
women based on perceived interests. It asks whether cultural and social norms result in distinct 
gender-specific motives, which in turn influence the savings and asset building behavior of men 
and women. The need to raise funds for a dowry, for example, may lead Indian women to save 
more than men in same age cohort as demonstrated by the study of Deolalikar and Rao (1998).  
Factory women in Indonesia in the 1980￿s saved on average 30 percent of their income for the 
purpose of giving it to their families in times of distress.  In Korea, where young women are the 
primary source of labor in export industries, Kim (1997) found that among their highest 
priorities in asset building is to save for a dowry and to finance the education of their siblings. 
These studies suggest that gender-based norms influence patterns of saving. 
The fourth research area focuses on the idea that allocation decisions in financial asset 
ownership are gendered. Part of the explanation is ascribed to risk aversion differences 
(Bajtelsmit and Bernasek 1996), to financial market fragmentation and to the varying degrees of 
control specific assets afford their owners (Johnson 2004). These characteristics lie at the heart  6
of informal forms  of savings such as the rotating credit and savings associations (ROSCAs), 
occupational savings groups, etc. which are prevalent in many rural and urban areas in 
developing countries. Studies have demonstrated that the specific type of asset individuals 
choose to save in is influenced by intra-household gender dynamics. For example, Bangladeshi 
women restrain from having assets in the form of large sums of cash since this is likely to attract 
the attention of male household members who then take control of those assets.  In Ghana, 
access to an informal savings program enables women to save money without other household 
members knowing the amount. Other studies on ROSCAs and savings clubs in Gambia and 
Indonesia indicate that many of these groups are all-female to prevent men from monopolizing 
the funds (Adams and Fitchett 1992).  The findings of the Gugerty (1999) study on informal 
savings in rural Kenya reveal that women have a greater preference than men for participation in 
ROSCAs.
6    
 
III. THE CONTEXT OF THE BANGKOK HOUSEHOLD SAMPLE 
 
This section contextualizes the empirical investigation to be carried out in sections IV and V. 
We first provide a brief discussion of the socio-economic conditions faced by urban, poor and 
low-income households in our sample. Then, we describe the sampling method used and the 
survey data collection method. 
Socio-economic developments in Thailand especially since the 1997 financial crisis have 
set up conditions for a significant expansion of the informal economy. Unfortunately, there are 
no reliable longitudinal data on informal sector employment in Thailand as with many 
developing countries.  But, according to the first 1999 National Statistic Office Homework 
Survey (NSOHS), more than 20 million are in the informal economy (National Statistics Office 
2000, Pichetpongsa 2004).  Informal sector activities are diverse, ranging from self-employed 
activities such as dressmaking, street vending and variety store enterprises to drivers, temporary  
wage workers in the construction sector, domestic service workers and home-based, piece rate 
work.   
                                                 
6. For example, in examining the prevalence of specific forms of assets such as informal accounts in rotating 
savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) in Kenyan households, Anderson and Baland (2001) argue that the 
predominance of women as ROSCAs members is not accidental. They found that saving in this form is a strategy a 
wife employs to protect her savings against claims by her husband for immediate consumption.  7
The NSOHS has documented that approximately three hundred thousand workers are 
home-based, among which 55,000 live in the metropolitan Bangkok area. The majority among 
them are women workers, paid on a piece rate basis in insecure jobs and contractual work 
arrangements that carry no benefits, retirement plans or access to worker rights protection. 
Typical tasks they perform include shoe-stitching and assembling, jewelry cutting, ready to 
wear clothes making, needlework, artificial flower making and food processing. Many of the 
poor, low-income neighborhoods in urban centers like Bangkok have become quintessential 
￿informal sector￿ communities. 
  Our study uses information drawn from multi-visit interviews of 268 heads and spouses 
during the period of June to September, 2002,
7 in three squatter Bangkok communities. The 
survey data was collected as part of a four-country research project investigating issues related 
to informal employment and home-based productive activities. Accordingly, three districts were 
randomly selected:  Udomsuk in the northern part of Bangkok, Nomklao in the center and 
Namawin located in the east.  For our purposes, we utilize a sub-sample of 134 couples￿ 
households.
8 It is worth noting that during the interview process care was taken to hold separate 
interviews for household heads and their spouses on savings, credit and household decision-
making. 
  The majority of the households in our sample fall in the lowest income quintile within 
Bangkok, placing them below the 60% of the average household income in this metropolitan 
area 
9 (Nguanbanchong 2004). An indication that also points to their low-income status is that 
all three districts are registered with the Community Development Office of Bangkok. In 
addition, all interviewed households live on illegally occupied lands.
10  
Using the most recent census data available, the households that comprise our sample 
were selected randomly. The recall method was employed in asking assets questions as 
members were asked to provide information for the beginning and the end of a six month 
                                                 
7. The data used in  our analysis were collected by American University researchers in cooperation with HomeNet, 
Thailand, a network of women￿s and community development organizations.  
8. For this study, we excluded households that are single-adult headed as our focus is on differences between men 
and women within the same household, rather than differences between male and female headed households. 
9. For the country as a whole these households stand at or above the average national household income roughly at 
15,553 Thai Baht ($353). Are these households ￿poor￿? In light of the capabilities approach, metric concepts of 
absolute poverty have come under scrutiny, but discussion of this complex issue is beyond the scope of our paper. 
10. With regard to their dwellings, 22 households (16.5%) declared they ￿owned￿ the dwelling built on the illegally 
occupied land, 72 (54%) paid rent to whomever originally had built the dwelling and 39 (29.3%) did not pay any 
rent.  8
period. Interviews were conducted in every seventh household of the roster, as long as at least 
one household member (household head or spouse) was engaged in home-based work or other 
self-employed in the informal sector.  
  Savings, asset ownership, asset pawning and asset sale questions were posed to 
household heads and spouses separately to maintain confidentiality and to allow the respondent 
to share information that s/he may not necessarily want to share with other household members. 
To check their reliability, asset questions were rephrased and then asked in a different part of the 
survey module. The net stock of tangible assets as of the time of the interview are based on the 
responses given to questions regarding what assets they owned in the past six months and 
deducting those that they claimed to have been either sold, pawned, given away or lost. The 
information on the stock of financial assets utilized in this study are based on the responses to 
the following question: ￿How much saving do you have in [type of financial institution] now?￿ 
Hence it is based on what each individual reports as their savings in a particular financial 
instrument, in this case, deposits in banks (formal financial institutions) and in different 
informal savings groups. Note that careful attention was given to including all existing types of 
informal saving groups and formal financial institutions.  
 
IV.  REAL AND FINANCIAL ASSETS AMONG URBAN POOR HOUSEHOLDS IN 
THAILAND 
    
Assets held by households differ by the function they serve as well as by degree of liquidity. 
Savings and financial assets are the most common ones used for precautionary purposes as they 
can easily be converted into cash to deal with idiosyncratic shocks or meet expenses during 
times of hardship. But many households in our sample save in the form of tangible or real 
assets, predominantly jewelry and household durable goods. They serve not only as store of 
value but also are used as collateral in asset pawn market or are sold when cash is short. These 
assets also provide immediate use value￿whether for consumption or productive/business 
purposes￿to its owner. The importance of real or tangible assets particularly to low-income 
households defies the traditional notion of savings as non-consumption. Hence running them 
down carries implications that directly affect consumption or the generation of future incomes in 
the case of business assets such as sewing machines.  
  9
A.  Composition and Ownership Pattern of Real Assets  
The predominant forms of real assets owned jointly or individually by heads of households and 
spouses in our sample are a) jewelry and gold, b) household appliances, c) shop  (business-
related) assets and d) transport vehicles as assets that they owned. There were only ten 
households (7.4%) with members that reported ownership of rural land and none of urban 
land.
11 About 8 % or eleven of the households reported their dwellings as ￿owned￿.
12 The low 
proportion of households in the sample with land and house assets indicates that they are not an 
important part of the asset composition in these urban poor households.   
 
Table 1 
Proportion of All Households with Assets by Asset Type(N=268)    
 
Type of Owned  Asset 
 
  Land  Private 
Dwellings 





















The above results suggest that low-income and poor households are not homogeneous 
but rather, they experience different levels of asset poverty. As Table 1 shows some household 
appliances (e.g. television, small tabletop stove, refrigerator, etc.) were present in all but the 
poorest households - the bottom one percent of the sample. Business or shop assets were 
pertinent to only ten percent, and jewelry and means of transport were found present in twenty 
five percent of the households interviewed.
13  
Assets may be jointly owned or individually held by the head of the household and the 
spouse.
14 
 Household appliances, and in some cases, transport vehicles tend to be joint assets. 
                                                 
11. As mentioned earlier, the households in the sample are all illegal occupants of the land in which they dwell. 
12. In a separate part of the questionnaire it was revealed that those owner occupied households have been 
recipients of remittances.  Roughly fifty percent said they were paying rent and the remaining were living rent free.   
13. The issue of whether these households are ￿poor,￿ the depth of poverty they experience and its implications for 
men and women is of immense interest. In this sample, the average value of total real assets ranges from around 
7,000 baht at the bottom tenth percentile to around 200,000 at the ninetieth.  
Although beyond the scope of this paper, the authors are currently investigating this matter in a comparative study 
between Thailand and Equador. 
14. In some cases, the issue of whether ownership of an asset was ￿jointly held￿ presented some difficulty as the 
value of the asset reported by spouse and head differed. We use the assumption that if the husband reports the same 
asset (with a reported value within a 15% upper and lower bound) as that of the wife, then it is considered joint. 
The description of the asset was detailed enough, for example a vehicle, or a stove, to make this a reasonable 
assumption.  10
(see Table 2). For the most part, real assets declared by the respondents as individually owned 
included tools, sewing machines, freezers and different means of transport such as vender carts, 
bicycles, motorcycles and trucks.  
      
Table 2 
Ownership Rate and Mean Value of Real Assets by Type of Asset (in Baht) 
 
             
WOMEN￿S ASSETS  MEN￿S ASSETS  JOINT ASSETS  Type of Owned 































  27% (36)  20,438    42% (56)  25,036        5% (7)   5,649 
3. Appliance(s)        0     0         0  0    95% (127)  14,600 
 
4. Business  19% (26)  2,641     4% (6)  202      0.7% (1)     1,000 
 
Total   98% (131)  43,473    98% (131)     46,713    95% (127)  20,256 
 
Notes:   a. Proportion of  the husbands or wives sample who currently own asset for individual assets. Proportion 
of  household sample for jointly owned assets. 
b. Mean value for all respondents in husbands￿ and wives￿ subsamples. In the case of joint assets, it refers 
to the reported mean value for all household sample. 
 
Table 2 gives the mean values of real assets (excluding land and housing) that are individually 
owned by men and women in our household sample. It shows that more men than women own 
vehicles while women dominate in business shop assets and jewelry. Appliances primarily, but 
also some transport vehicles and business assets were reported as jointly owned. The mean 
value of total real assets is slightly higher for men than for women and over all joint assets 
comprise a smaller part of the assets women and men hold.    
The observed pattern of asset ownership may be partly explained by the nature of 
employment or income earning activities that these respondents are engaged in. While a very 
small proportion of women (1%) in our sample are not currently employed, the majority of 
them (87.3%) work in the informal sector; in some cases as subcontracted homeworkers but 
most reported as self-employed (64.5%). Self-employed workers typically have small, mobile 
shops or microenterprises that require investment assets such as a sewing machine, tools, food 
vending cart, etc. In contrast, 41% of men respondents are employed in the formal sector,  11
mostly as wage or salaried employees compared to 12.7% of women. Women, on the other 
hand, tend to own more jewelry assets than men, a practice not uncommon in many developing 
countries such as India, Pakistan and the Philippines. On the other hand, men tend to own more 
transport assets than women.  
 
B.  Composition and Ownership Pattern of Financial Asset 
We examine next the level of financial assets owned by men and women in urban, low-income 
households.  Their financial assets consist of two types: a) formal financial assets, mainly bank 
checking and saving deposits, and b) informal savings deposits in a variety of informal savings 
groups such as rotating credit and savings associations (ROSCAs), community-based or local 
saving groups (called ￿Kloom Omsap￿ or ￿Kloom Sajja￿), occupational savings groups (called 
￿Kloom Archeep￿) as well as semi-formal institutions such as saving cooperatives 
(Nguanbanchong 2004).  Household savings were pooled in some cases  (38% of household 
sample) and non-pooled in others (62%). For our present study, we concentrate only on 
individually held accounts.  
  12
Table 3 
Participation Rates and Mean Value of Financial Assets by Type of  Saving Asset 
(Mean Value in Thai Baht, Standard Deviation in Parenthesis) 
           
WOMEN￿S ASSETS
a  MEN￿S ASSETS
a  Type of Owned 
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B. Informal Assets
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Notes:   
a. Reported value of current financial assets of husband and wife as separate savings.  
b. Women￿s (and men￿s) participation rates refer to proportion of  wives￿ (and husbands) sample who reported  
separate savings. For joint assets,  participation rate refers to the proportion of the  household sample with both 
husbands and wives reporting savings in a particular financial institution. 
 c. Mean value for all respondents in husbands￿ and wives￿ subsamples. In the case of joint assets, it refers to the 
reported mean value for the household sample. 
d. Formal financial assets include only savings and checking deposits in  banks. Informal financial assets refer to 
the current savings stock in different informal savings associations in the community at the time of the survey. 
They are measured as the amount of cash deposits, which is obtained from the question: ￿How much total savings 
do you currently have in this form of savings account?￿     
 
 
Table 3 provides the participation rate and the mean value of the financial assets held by women 
and men in the sample households. It confirms that the majority of financial assets among poor 
households are held in informal savings. We also found that the bottom quintile does not have 
any bank account savings. Interestingly, women in the bottom half of the distribution tend to  13
have more financial assets than men do. The reverse is true, however, in the highest decile of the 
distribution: women in this case tend to have less financial assets than men.  
 
V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
 
This section explores what may exert influence on the value and form of assets held by women 
and men in our sample. We use a number of individual and household characteristics that 
represent differences in gender norms and ability to accumulate wealth, based on income. 
￿Gendered￿ social norms influence a person￿s own perception of interests, desires and 
obligations.  From meeting consumption expenses such as food to the ￿feminine￿ and 
￿masculine￿ characterization of acquired goods like jewelry and cars, being male or female 
matters as it affects our sense of duty and perception of accepted behavior.
15 At the same time, 
differential access to education, gender-based patterns of employment and job segmentation in 
labor markets can lead to differences in incomes earned by women and men. In the case of our 
sample, women￿s relative economic vulnerability￿by virtue of the precarious or informalized 
nature of their employment￿and their principal role in household maintenance and care work 
may cause women￿s pattern of asset ownership to differ from that of men. In the empirical 
analysis that follows, we frame our discussion around these two main arguments. 
More concretely, we specify the following reduced form equation for the asset 
composition decision by individual I as: 
where: 
The observed dependent variable, Assetij, refers to the value of a specific form of asset 
held by individual i in  household j.  Xij and Zj are vectors of observable characteristics at the 
individual and household levels respectively, which influence the decisions involving asset 
                                                 
15. For an in depth examination of this issue see Kabeer  (1999). 
 
*
ij if   > 0




     Asset Asset




    (2) 
*
ij j ij ij =   +   +  Asset XZ βγε          (1)  14
accumulation and allocation. Both β  and γ  are unknown parameters to be estimated. Since our 
data contain both husbands and wives, the error terms are not independent across individuals 
leading to biased standard errors for the coefficient estimates.  Consequently, we obtain 
unbiased estimates of variance by calculating robust (Huber/White) standard errors. 
It should be noted that the above Tobit model imposes the same economic structure on 
both the decision regarding the form an asset is held in and the amount allocated on it; hence it 
uses the same regressors and parameters.  Thus, for estimation purposes, the equation that 
determines the value of specific types of assets individually owned by the respondent becomes a 
function of the same set of exogenous household and individual characteristics that determine 
whether or not to have their assets in that particular form. 
We test whether women own different levels and forms of assets from that of men by 
focusing only on individually owned assets. That is, only the value of types of real and financial 
assets held separately by individual respondents are used as dependent variables. We also test 
whether the distribution of assets between real and financial forms as measured by asset share, 
is significantly different between men and women in our sample. We estimate a basic model to 
examine several individual and household-level factors that may influence the dependent 
variable, Assetij. If the individual decides to hold assets in a particular form, then   Assetij is 
positive; if he/she decides not to, then Assetij is zero.  
The individual-level, independent variables, X ij, in the basic model are the following: a) 
gender (FEMALE), b) lifecycle stage, represented by the age of the individual (AGE) and 
(AGESQ), c) the type of employment of the respondent as represented by the self-employed 
dummy variable (SELFEMP) and the formal sector job dummy variable (FORMALJOB). In 
addition, we included individual-specific control variables such as: d) educational attainment 
represented by the years of schooling (SCHLYR) and e) social cohesion and urban living 
experience as proxied by years lived in Bangkok (CITYYR).  The household-specific variables, 
Zj include: a) total household earned income in the past month (WKINC) and b) household 
composition represented by school age (5-14) children (NUMKIDS). We also included two 
household decision making dummy variables to capture the issue of whose earnings are used for 
meeting basic expenses such as food. The latter are represented by the dummy (FOOD1) if the 
earnings of the respondent are exclusively used for food expenses and by the dummy (FOOD2) 
 
  15
if the earnings of both the respondent and his/her spouse are used for food expenses.
16 To 
capture any community-level effects, we included community dummy variables, (SITE1) and 
(SITE2) for Namawin and Udomsuk communities respectively. These location effects are 
included to pick up community features that may influence the saving behavior and asset pattern 
of community residents such as prevalence of informal savings organization, degree of threat of 
eviction from land being illegally occupied and so forth.  
The regression results for total real assets and total financial assets are given in Table 4. 
The gender variable in Model 1a implies that women would tend to own more real assets than 
men, holding all else equal, but this is not statistically significant. Having a job in the formal 
sector increases the value of individual real assets compared to those in the informal sector and 
the results are significant at 5% level. Those with higher household earnings tend to have more 
real assets and this is significant at 1% level.  
With respect to the stock of total financial assets, the results in Model 1b show that 
women own less financial assets in individual accounts (more than 17,000 baht) than men and 
this is significant at the 1% level.  Older respondents, those with higher education, those with 
jobs in the formal sector, and those whose earnings are mainly used to meet food expenses have 
more financial assets; all these Tobit results are significant at 1% level. We also find that 
respondents in higher income households have significantly more financial assets compared to 
those with lower household earnings. Those living in Namawin (site1) area tend to have less 
financial assets, while those in Udomsuk have more financial assets compared to both Nomklao 
(site2) and Namawin (base) communities. 
                                                 
16. The base, someone else￿s income other than the respondent, is used for food expenses.  16
Table 4 
Coefficient Estimates from Tobit Estimation:   
Value of Individual Real and Financial Assets in Urban, Low-Income Households.  
(standard errors in parenthesis) 
 
  Model 1a 
Value of All Real Assets 
Model 1b 

























































Observations 260  260 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Next, we examine the determinants of asset composition of individuals in our sample. 
Table 5 presents results of the Tobit model with the share of real assets to total assets as 
dependent variable. We find that the fact that women keep more of their individual assets in real 
(tangible) form is statistically significant at 5% level. This may be a reflection of the fact that 
certain assets, such as jewelry, is so prevalent among women since it gives them more control 
over asset use. Interestingly, those with formal sector jobs tend to have a greater portion of their  17
assets in real or tangible form and this is significant at the 10% level. The results of the 
community effects suggest that those living in Namawin (site1) and Udomsuk (site 2) 




Coefficient Estimates from Tobit Estimation: 
   Ratio of Individual Real Assets to Total Individual Assets   
(standard errors in parenthesis) 
 
  Model 2 















Household Earned Income  -0.000 
(0.000) 
Years lived in city  -0.003 
(0.002) 
Years of schooling  -0.017 
(0.015) 










*** significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level  18
Given the relative importance of real assets to women in urban, low-income households, 
we now examine the level of significance of the gender-specific compositional patterns of real 
assets held by our sample respondents. Table 6 presents the regression results for the following 
main categories of real assets namely shop assets, transport assets and gold and jewelry. The 
gender variable performed robustly in all the estimations.  Being female is significant and 
positively related to higher value of shop assets as well as that of jewelry. The opposite is true 
with respect to the value of transport. The coefficient suggests that men have higher value of 
transport assets (about 81,991 baht more) compared to women and this is also significant at 1% 
level.       19
Table 6 
Coefficient Estimates from Tobit Estimation:   
Value of Individual Shop, Transport and Jewelry Assets  
(standard errors in parenthesis) 
 
  Model IIIa  Model IIIb  Model IIIc 
  Value of Shop Assets  Value of  Transport 
Assets 























































































Observations 260  260  260 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  20
The significant gender patterns observed on specific types of assets may be partly 
explained by the type of occupation generally held by women and men in our sample. Home-
based work is prevalent among women in our sample as mentioned earlier so that they are less 
likely to need a transport vehicle while men tend to hold jobs that require mobility. There are 
more women in our sample, compared to men, who are either self-employed or subcontracted, 
piece rate homeworkers. This implies that women are likely to have business-related tools such 
as sewing machines, cutters, etc.  The regression results on the value of transport asset may also 
be explained by the type of transport that men own such as trucks or vans, which are likely to be 
more expensive than vendor carts or makeshift cars with food stalls. Gender-based and cultural 
norms may also have some influence in the kind of assets held by men and women. For 
example, other studies show that jewelry traditionally serves as a buffer asset for consumption 
smoothing in Indonesia since they can be easily pawned or sold (see Frankenberg, et al 2003). 
Since Thai women are responsible for household maintenance and care of household members, 
they are likely to save in this form of asset as well.  In addition, jewelry provides use value to 
women since they can wear these assets on special occasions. On the other hand, machines and 
vehicles tend to be associated as ￿men￿s assets￿ in some societies. 
The results of the Tobit model (3b) given in Table 6 show that those who are wage and 
salaried workers and employed in formal sector jobs are likely to have higher value of transport 
assets and this is significant at 1% level. Individuals in higher income households also tend to 
have higher value of transport assets and this is significant at 5% level. The impact of 
community dummy variables on the value of jewelry and shop assets are found to be significant 
at the 1% and 10% levels respectively. Those living in Nomklao (site1) have lower value of 
shop assets and this is significant at 10% level. Those living in Udomsuk (site 2) own a higher 
value of jewelry than those in other communities and this is significant at 1% level. This may be 
due to the fact that Nomklao have fewer self-employed workers compared to the Namawin area. 
The prevalence of pawnshops near the Udomsuk, on the other hand, may be a factor in the 
relative importance of jewelry assets to its residents. 
  Finally, we examine whether there is any gender variation in the level of informal and 
formal financial assets held as individual accounts. The results in Table 7 are striking in that 
they show the stock of informal financial assets (held in separate accounts) to be higher among 
women compared to men and this is shown to be statistically significant at 1% level.  Women, 
on the other hand, have a lower stock of formal financial assets (in bank accounts) than men  21
with the results being statistically significant at 5 % level. Older as well as more educated 
respondents have more informal and formal financial assets. Those whose earnings are 
responsible in meeting food expenses also tend to have more informal and formal financial 
assets and the results are significant at 5% level.  
Table 7 
 
Coefficient Estimates from Tobit Estimation: 
Value of Informal and Formal Financial Assets 
(standard errors in parenthesis) 
 
  Model IVa  Model IVb 
  Value of Formal Financial 
Assets 


























































Observations 260  260 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
**significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level 
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  As expected, the household earnings effects on both formal and informal financial asset 
stocks are positive and significant at 5% level. We also find that those who are self-employed 
and who belong to higher income households have more formal financial assets and the results 
are statistically significant at 5% level. Respondents living in Namawin have lower informal 
financial assets compared to those living in Udomsuk and Nomklao. This is consistent with the 
findings of Nguanbanchong (2004) in her study of informal financial savings in Thailand.  She 
points out that the savings ratio of Udomsuk residents was the highest rate among the three 
communities, followed by Nomklao (p. 137). The fact that these communities are older and that 
relations of trust and solidarity are strengthened by the relative high number of active 
community organizations, may explain the location or community dummy effects. 
  
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
  
The preceding discussion provides a detailed account of the different types of assets these poor 
households own. It attempts to fill a gap in the literature regarding intra-household differences 
in ownership between men and women. Using a random sample of 268 men and women drawn 
from couple￿s households in three, low-income communities in Bangkok, we discerned several 
gendered patterns of asset ownership with respect to level and composition.  
  Since the majority in our household sample belong to the lowest income quintile of the 
Bangkok Metropolitan area and have at least one member engaged in home-based work, it is not 
surprising that there are only few households that own land and housing assets. Real assets such 
as jewelry, household appliances, shop (business-related) assets and transport vehicles as well as 
financial assets in the form of informal savings accounts are more common forms held by 
women and men respondents.  An empirical analysis is conducted to explore whether assets held 
by women and men are different, both in value and in form.  
  The regression results using the Tobit model suggest that women own slightly more real 
assets than men although this is not statistically significant. We also examined whether there are 
any gender-specific patterns in the types of real and financial assets held by our sample 
respondents. The results show that being female is significantly and positively related to higher 
values of shop assets and jewelry. The opposite is true with respect to transport assets; men have 
higher value of transport assets compared to women and this is statistically significant as well. 
On the other hand, women own less financial assets in individual accounts and this is  23
statistically significant. With respect to financial assets, women save more in informal financial 
assets in ROSCAs, occupational groups and cooperatives but have lower formal financial assets, 
compared to men.  
Our  findings among households in these three low-income Bangkok communities join 
in with those efforts of previous studies that have identified gender differences in savings and 
asset ownership. Clearly, further research is needed to explore how generalizable these patterns 
are. To validate and conduct robust testing of these findings we need more data, preferably at 
the national level.  It is our hope that gender asymmetries in asset ownership will become a 
greater part of the discourse in academia and policymaking circles alike.  24
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